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A Voice Of Afro-American Opinion

Vol. 4 No. 3

April-May, 1975

U. S. Intervention In Chile
In President Ford's admission and
arrogant defense of the United States'
subversive role in the fascist coup which
overthrew the elected Allende government in Chile , he characterized the
tragedy as being "in the best interest of
the Chilean people, and certainly of the
United States". This flagrant example of
the aggressive nature of U.S. foreign
policy has ended many illusions about
the purpose of U.S. "involvement" in the
developing countries .
Friends of Africa are especially alarmed
because many of the Central Intelligence
Agency and State Department operatives, their hands steeped in the blood of
the Chilean people , have since been
reassigned to African posts. Among these
are Nathaniel Davis. ambassador to Chile
during the 1973 bloody coup and now
assigned by Kissinger to be Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs.
Dean Hinton, a specialist in economic
intelligence, Director of AID (Agency of
International Development) in Chile
(1969-1971) and a member of the National Securitv Council Subcommittee on
"Nationalization of U.S. Companies"
abroad, has become ambassador to Zaire.
Frederick Latrash. the AID official who
helped bring down the Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954, undermined
the Nkrumah government in Ghana in
1966 and served as the Political Director
of the U.S. Embassy in Santiago in 1971 ,
has been reassigned to Africa. Also
William Bowdler, a member of the
National Security Council and known for
his CIA activities in Latin America, has
been appointed ambassador to South
Africa.

Before 1970
U.S. intervention in Chile began long
before the POPULAR UNITY COALITION (UP) began to successfully challenge the U .S. role in Chile. After UP won
the executive branch of the Chilean
government , U.S. covert penetration in
Chile became more complete. In the
economic sphere, a merging of the

native Chilean monopolies with the U.S.
based multinational corporations developed . Even physical mergers were reflected in the often An 5 1o names of the
big Chilean bourgeoisie. For example, a
member of the "Edwards family " (an
important Chilean capitalist family whose
fraudulent banking practices were exposed by the UP government) fled to the
U.S. where he became vice-president of
Pepsi-Cola. In 50 years U.S. monopolies
extracted over $10 billion from Chile,
fully one half of all the wealth Chile had
produced in 400 years.

Cultural penetration was especially
prominent - many radio stations were
totally devoted to U.S. music and TV was
completely dominated by U.S. programs.
One of the most popular UP measures
was to require a minimum percentage of
Chilean programs on the radio, giving
rise to a great resurgence of Chilean
culture.
U.S. interference in Chilean politics
has been confirmed by the testimony of
CIA Director William F. Colby at the
House Armed Services Committee. Back
in 1964. $3 million in CIA funds was
poured into the Christian Democrats
Party which narrowly defeated Salvador
All£:nde for the presidency. No doubt
this sum of money, which was huge by
Chilean standards, was decisive in the
(,onti1111<•tl o n (),Jg<• 7)
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History of the Popular
Front Movement in Chile
From 1939 to the election of Salvador
Allende in 1970, the Popular Front Movement had gone through many coalitiom
without having the real support of the
masses of the Chilean people. It was not
until 1970 that the Popular Front, under
the leadership of Allende, had the full
support of the Chilean people.
The history of the development of the
Popular Front Movement starts during
World War I when the demand for
Chile\ nitrates and copper reached
unprecedented heights. The subsequent
growth of mining , manufacturing, and
commerce led in turn to an enlarged
industrial proletariat .
.
The depression nf tne 1930s created
the objective conditions for the radicalization of this emerging proletarian class.
According to the League of Nations,
Chile was hit harder ty :he effects of the
Great Depression than any other nation
in the world. Sale of copper and nitrates.
upon which Chile had depended for
more than 70 percent of its national
income, declined from $27 million in
1929 to about $3.5 million in 1932.
Between October 1929 and October 1930
imports fell 88 percent. Moreo,er, salaries declined, and the cost of staples rose
drastically.
As the Communists and Socialists
attempted to represent the interest of the
proletariat, the Radical Party became the
party of the middle-sectors. The Radical
Partv had been in existence since the
mid~nineteenth century. Although by
the 1930s the Party had become associated with the rising urban middlesector, it had the broadest class base of all
the Chilean parties. Side br side within
this party were landed proprietors, wealthy mine-owners, merchants, teachers,
civil sen:•ants. artisans and other strata oi
the middle-class. The multi-interest ba se
of this party tended to give it a centrist
character.
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Chile's Experience and Problems Of The Class Struggle
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The sPcond half oi the articif' will h p puhli~h!'d
,n the next i,,u e of th t:> Alric-an Agenda.

All the c:rucial questions of struggle for
the implementation of profound tramformation s and transition to socialism are
being vigorously di~cussed in connection
with the militar~·-fascist coup in Chile. Of
course, it is up to the Chilean comrades
10 draw exhaustive conclusions about the
experience of the Popular Unity government and about the causes of its defeat ,
and they already have made the first
steps in this direction.
But the experience of the events in
Chile is not of national importance alone.
It is important for the entire international
workers ' and Communist movement. As
is known, most Communist Parties in
capitalist countries are exponents of the
revolution's peaceful development. The
events in Chile introduce many new
elements into the substantiation of the
revolution's development in a peaceful
form . For this reason the Communist
Parties strive to draw conclusions from
the brutal lessons of the revolution 's
defeat in Chile.
At the same time the gloating ultraLeftist elements, organizations of the
Maoist type and the Trotskyites are
sacrilegiously trying to use the Chilean
revolution 's tragedy for increasing their
meager theoretical baggage. There have
already appeared qu ite a few articles in
which these extremists expound rather
expertly about the erroneousness of the
very idea of transition to socialism by
peaceful means, and about the correctness of their own adventuristic concepts.
Thus, Krivine, one of the leaders of
French Trotskyites, openly declares :
"Peaceful roads of transition to socialism
end up with bloodbaths."
Pseudo-scientific talk about the causes
of the coup in Chile can be encountered
also in the bourgeois press, which presents the Allende government 's policy in
a distorted, slanderous manner and holds
it responsible for all the difficulties in the
country .
Bourgeois ideologists try to prove the
incompatibility of socialism and democracy : the impossibility of social progress
with i n the framework of socialism in
general and along the roads of peaceful
development in particular. They contend
that the struggle for socialism will inevitably be accompanied by fierce civil wars
and blood shed, by brute force and
countless sacrifices, economic discloca lion and a worsening of the living
standards of the popular masses . For this
rea son , they \ay , it is betlt>r to suffer the
harthhips inherent in bourgeois relations
than to accept senseless '>i!C rifi<es and

l, lo , •<h ill' d in thl' n.im v of illu,ory hup l·, .
Tliv ideulut-:i,b o! tfw IJourgl'oi~ie stri vP
to cfotH'dit lhe ver y idea of sociali~m in
the mind, of the ma sses as allegedly
destru ctive bv its verv nature.
So th e e~e nts i~ Chile attract the
att e ntion of tht> most diverse political
forces . and numerous d emagogic sp eculations about the Chilean tragedy are
appearing. For this reason, while emphasizing th e priority right of Chilean comrades to determine the causes and study
the genesis of the militar y-fascist coup,
Marxists in other countries strive to take
part in the theoretical analysis of the
problems and prospects of struggle for
democracy and socialism in the light of
the Chilean experience.
The international importance of
Chile 's experience stems from the fact
that it focuses many problems of struggle
for the peaceful transition to socialism
that are common to many other parties
and countries. The tendencies of class
struggle and pol itical life in Chile reflected in a concentrated form the contemporary stage in the world revolutionary process, the logic of its development,
the conlemporary manifestations of the
strengths and weaknesses of the working
class movement, sober calculations and
the illusions and delusions that hav e not
yet been overcome .
All this means that the essence of
Chile 's experience can be correctly
understood only in the context of the
common problems facing the international workers ' and Communist movement . Lenin' s teaching on imperialism
and his theory of the socialist revolution
are the key to the analysis of the main
questions of the development of cla ss
struggle at the contemporary stage, of
the experience and lessons of the
Chil ea n revolution, as well as Lenin 's
methodology, which shows that the
correctness of an analysis is ensured first
of all by a deeper penetration into the
constantly developing dialectics of inter connection between the international
and the national.
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It c .in I ,(' '> ,lH! "ith full confi<knrr th,H
at th e pr ec;e nt ,t.ige of cla s, str uggle the
que stion of perf ect i ng the entire system
of political guidance. of rai sing its scientifi c level and tactical effectiveness i'> one
of the crucial pr o bl e ms of the world
revolutionar y process. A deep stud y of all
aspects of Chile 's experience will make ii
pos sible to expand the theoretical and
politi ca l knowledge of the revolutionary
vanguard .
Most contributors to the foreign press
devote their articles about Chile mostly
to a search for errors and miscalc ulations
in the government's activities , whi ch are
purported to constitute nearly the sole
cause of defeat. This point of view is onesided .
Correct conclusions from the experience of the Chilean events can be drawn
only on condition of a synthetically
integral study of the process of the
revolution's development from victory to
defeat. Such a study includes : a) a
generalization of all the new creative
elements that have been introduced by
the theory and practice of the Communist Party of Chile into the teaching of the
revolution ; b) a sober analysis of the
alignment and real correlation of class
forces at various pha ses of the revo lution's developm ent ; c) the real mistakes
and miscalculations made by the Popular
Unity government. In its documents the
Communist Party of Chile admits to the
exist e nce of such mistakes. In it s Appeal
to the People of October 11 , 1973, it says
that in the three years of the Popular
Unity government 's stay in power " important transformations have been carried out but serious mistakes have also
been made ."
The c reative approach to the main
tasks, to the alignment of class forces and
th e possibilities of th ei r regrouping at the
first strategic stage of the revolution is an
important achievement of the Communist Party of Chile.
The Communi st Party clearl y determin ed 1he direction of the movement 's
main blow : against U .S. imperialism
which he ld sway in the country; against
loca l latifundists , who have m erged with
th e Yankees and local monopoly capital ;
against local monopo ly capital, which is
connect ed with Ameri can capital and the
loca l lat ifundists.
A revolutionary , cons tructive platform
of struggle was elaborated on the basis of
this co n cept. It was accepted by the
parti es forming the Popular Unity coalitio n that had come into being on the
initiative of the Communist Party . The
Communist Party ,md the Socialist Party
reMhed agreement on unity of action
and thic; tonsiderabl y raised the fi~htin~
(1 onti11111 •c/ on f)Jg<' 3/

:i: ,.·
c. o n~idc rab lc re\ :Jiu;, ·.~.,:" . 11 ;..-; •!i~, -" ;,n:i
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standing on a hi gher ur ~J~ iz.itio nal len:> I,
it d e mon strated its dbil :ty tu bec o m e the
hC"cPmonic cla ss and came o ut as the
m:i.in mot i\'e fo rce of the revolu t ionar\·
trJmformations .
The correct identificat ion of priority
tasks of struggle accorded with the
interests of the broadest segments of the
nation : the peasants , craftsmen, small
industrialist s and merchants, the working
int e lligentsia.
In developing the struggle for the antiimperialist, anti-oligarchic revolution the
Communist Party of Chile proceeded
from the assumption that a national crisis
was maturing in the country as a result of
the aggravation of all the contradictions
inherent in Chilean society.
First of all , contradictions between the
nation and U.S. imperialism had become
aggravated late in the 1960s and antiimperialist sentiments became extremely
widespread.
Secondly, there was a considerable
aggravation of the crisis of the soci_al
structures of Chilean society. The drop in
production , the growth of inflation, mass
unemployment, growing poverty of
working people and economic dislocation - all this pointed to the obsolescence and corruption of social relations
and their antipopular essence. There was
also an aggravation of contradictions
between the masses and the monopolistlatifundist upper crust.
Thirdly, there was a serious aggravation
of the political crisis, and the inability of
the ruling classes to administer the
country using the old methods became
manifest. This was a crisis of bourgeois
reformism, of which President Frei's
policy was an embodiment.
The ruling classes found themselves in
isolation. A crisis of Chilean society's
political structure set in . The content and
nature of the nation-wide political crisis
were determined by the sum total of all
these crisis phenomena.
Proceeding from a profound analysis
of the alignment of class forces in the
country, the historical traditions of the
country and the specificities of the
national crisis, the Communist Party of
Chile evolved a concept of peaceful
accomplishment of an anti-imperialist,
anti-oligarchic agrarian revolution with a
subsequent transition to socialism, and
outlined the political measures required
for the attainment of this task. In the
Party's opinion the greatest possibilities
for a peaceful solution of the main
question of the revolution - the question of power - were offered by presidential elections because victory in them
opens up the road to executive power.
The Communist Party of Chile and the
Popular Unity coalition adopted this
program, set course at taking over executive power and scored victory.
The phase of revolutionary socio-
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( }i th e Popula r L':iit ,
cu.il ltio n twcan after 1he forniation of the I and The Wilmington 1 O!
,\! l(•n de gm~ernmc: nt. These transforma- ·. j
.~·<!/;;:·: -~'" ~ ~•-~ :·,.-,l\~~Y~·•*"' '. ",7:-:-: ;'"":,r,. ;.
tion s we re carried out vv ith in th e frame1-vork of the Co nst it u1 ion and existing !
legi,lat io n. The Alle-nde government
scored really tr e mendous historic successes and enriched the th eo ry and
pract ice of the p eace ful deve lopment of
the revolution ,
Major socio-economic undertakings
were carried out within a short period of
time : the natural resources and the
mining industry were nationalized (copper, saltpeter, coal, iron ore) , a number
of industrial companies and the banking
The Reverend Benjamin Chavis , of the
system were socialized ; control was
United Church of Christ 's Commission
established over foreign trade; the
on Racial Justice, and h is co-defendants
estates of big landowners were expropriknown as the Wilmington, N.C. Ten need
ated and latifundism was actually liquiour active support to ensure that they are
dated; peasants were allotted land and
not railroaded to prison for an outranew cooperative and state forms of
geous combined sentence of 282 ye ar..
agrarian production were set up ; a state
on trumped-up false charges by the
sector of the economy was created and
North Carolina authorities. The Wilmingconsiderably expanded; the wages of
ton Ten case is one of the most blatant
workers, civil servants and servicemen
examples of the intensified racist and
were raised.
political repression in this country. Once
When assessing such measures as the
again, the victims of violence have been
nationalization of natural resources , forportrayed as the perpetrators.
eign monopolies and a number of local
In 1972, the Wilmington Ten were
companies, the socialization of most
convicted of arson , conspiracy to assault
banks and the establishment of control
emergency personnel and criminal reover foreign trade, that resulted in the
sponsibility for damages resulting from
forming of the State sector, it is necessary
•the 4-day Klu Klux Klan and Rights of
to bear in mind that they were carried
White People vigilante attack on them in
out at the stage of the democratic
1971 . The Wilmington Ten defendants
revolution and at the same time they
:Were actually defending a church in
considerably deepened the revolution ,
Wilmington's Black community fr-om the
furthered it, carried it beyond the frameracist and violent seige by the vigilantes.
work of democratic transformations and
Recently, the North Carolina Court of
created the embryo of socialism. Chile's
Appeals refused to grant the Wilmington
experience showed again that precisely
Ten a new trial. This gross injustice was
such is the dialectics of the development
handed down despite the wellof any democratic revolution in present
documented defense argument that
conditions. It is no longer possible to
there had been blatant miscarriage of
ignore this conclusion when working out
justice, and despite the evidence that
the strategic aims of the democratic stage
large secret payments were paid to two
of struggle in any country.
informers to testify against Rev. Chavis.
The big victories of the Popular Unity,
The defense attorneys are taking the case
its outstanding achievements in the
before the North Carolina Supreme
political and socio-economic fields were
Court; the case will be reviewed in June.
the first , very substantial contribution to
The African American Solidarity Comthe creation of a people's state, the first
mittee joins the National Alliance Against
steps along the road to socialism .
Racism and Political Repression and all
But the logic of struggle, naturally ,
progressive people in demanding that
demanded a further advance, a deepthe case be overturned and that the
ening of transformations, transition to
persecution of Rev. Ben Chavis and the
the solution of new tasks. In this context,
Wilmington Ten be halted!
I believe, there is reason to say that the
Most importantly, we urge you to write
democratic stage of the revolution conor wire the Hon. Rufus Edmisten, Anorsists of two phases, each of which has its
ney General , Raleigh, North Carolina
strategic orientation, its political and
27602, and petition him to join the
economic tasks, its specificity as regards
defense before the North Carolina Suthe alignment of forces.
preme Court in asking that the case be
The extremely urgent need of solving
overturned. At the very least , he must
the following inter-connected crucial
move for a new trial. Copies of petitions
problems emerged for Chile at this
for the Wilmington Ten can be obtained
ph ase : the political - the solution of the
from the NAARPR, 150 Fifth Ave . Room
question of power; the economic - the
804, New York , N.Y. 10010, tel epho ne
organization of the normal functioning
(212) 243-8555.
of economic life in cond iti ons of cardinal
United , the people can never be de(continued on page 8) ,
feated .
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The Fascist Coup and the
World Crisis of Imperialism

The fascis1 roup in Chil e took plac.e in
tht' co nl ex t of the world crisis of capitalism . It was 1estimony to the increa~ing
inability of the multinational and local
monopolies 10 impose their plans on
socie1y without viola1ing demo cratic
norms. It clearly confirmed the fact 1hat
the oligarchy and imperialism do not
hesita1e to establish tyra nnv to preserve
their privileges. The coup reflect ed th e
growing weakness of the capitalist
system , its historical decline.
Th e fascist coup is in striking contradiction to the march of history in our tim e.
The trend of historical development is
not determined by events like those that
shook our country on September 11,
1973. Although the fascists achieved
temporary success in our country, human ity is irresistibly moving towards the
triumph of peace, democracy and socia l-

ism .
The world balance has changed fundam enta lly in favour of the f orces of
progres s. This is reflected more and more
in such international organizations as the
Uni1ed Nations and the O rga nizati o n of
American States . where imperialist forces , and in particular L.: .S. imperialism ,
are finding themse lves in creasingly iso lated.

All this is taki ng place at a tim e when
imperialism is experienc ing its most
serious economic crisis since World War
II , while the socialist community is
registering ever greater economic and
political achievements , th ereby d emonstrating to the whole world th e advantages of the new sys1em which knows no
crises and is sreadilr forging ahead.
The Majority of the Population
Suffers from the Military Junta
and its Policy

The fascists sta nd for the adoption of
the econo mic model imposed from
without which is designed to turn Chile
into a country with a high concentration
of monopoly capital, low wages and
super-exploitation of the working class , a
country ope n to penetration by foreign
capital, they console themselves with the
illusion of economic development.
Owing to the plight of the wage
earners the demand for goods has sharply declined, and this results in the
impoveri,hment of the va ;t majority of
the ,mall ,md medium-bra r: ke1 proprietors. The position of the ov.-ners of trucks
and taxis , shopkeepers and small manuf a(lurn, . farmers and proff:ssionals, the
very st rilta which the put\chi<,ts used as
the instrumf'. nt s of th ei r , 'Jnspiracy, i\
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:::>y th P policy of th e junta give~ rne to
resiqance, true, in manv Cil~e~ muted,
but c lea rl y ex tend ing to ·the majorit\· of
1he population . Th e nightmare of the
inces sant ~oaring of prices weighs down
on millions of men and women.
\\ e sE>e blows struck at the working
clas,. the pcasan1s , office workers. all
wage and salar~ earners. The present
rulers are seeking to bring abou1 the
bankruptcy of non-monopoly propr ietors. All these sect ions are moving farth er
and farth er awa y from the junta . although originally many of them looked
to it with approval and hope.
The dissociation from the junta is
beginning to take an open form among
those sections of the working people
who were deceived into supporting the
anti-democratic
manoeu vres
which
paved the way to the coup . This app li es
to the workers of the copper industry
who toda y demand the conclusion of
collective bargaining agreements and the
restoration of the income leve l that
exi'iled in 1973, i.e., under the popular
unity government, prior to the unfortunate strike financed by the CIA .
\.\'hat is h;ippening in the Chri-tian
Democratic Part y is particularly indicative. The fascis t government has subject ed
the CDP to systematic houndin g. The
totalitarian concept rules out the existence of an y democratic organization,
even when it stands predo minantl y for
the interest of th e bourgeosie . Complete
rejection of democracy in any form
accords with th e esse nce of fasci~m . that
political expression of monopoly capital ism which means the subordination of all
of society to the interests of the minorit y.
The poli cy of repression hits at the
majority of the population , though in
varying degrees; it is particularly savag e
toward s revo lutionaries, but it affects all
democrats.
The Conditions Exist
for Building the Broadest Movement
of Anti - Fascist Unity
As th e May 1. 1974, appeal of the
Popular Unity Politi ca l Committee sa id ,
" Chile is faced with a great challenge to
which there ca n be only one answer : the
establishment of a broad anti-fascist front
of all the men , women and yo u•h of our
country, a front capable of overthrowing
the di ctatorship , creating a regenerated
democracy and return ing, with the sup port of the majority of the people, to the
road of revolutionary change." Thi s front
is open to all patriots; it excludes only the
ol,g,trc hy, the fascists and the collaborationists .
The prespnf situarion ha, reaffirmed
the· vitality of '>ori ali<,r-Communi<,t unity

a, M 1 e•,ent1al c·xrir<·\,ion c,f th!' un it\ ul
th!' wc,rking cla ,,. a unit ) rhat has
\ ' 11 H't~Pd and !,!<l in (·' d , tr(' rit:lh in thf>
cou r~·c, of protracted ,t ruggl t:~ and cummon expe r ience. It pre,uppo ses also the
, trPncthPning of Popular Unit, as an
ex pre~~ion of the de si re on th e p.irt 01
the more conscious se ction of the population to join forces. At the sa me time it is
proj ected further to joint ac1ion and
unit y with the ot her ,ections of the
population which did no1 support the
popular government but suffer today
from the tyranny of the dicta1orship.
These <,ections, organizations and partie s
should 1ake part in the Anti-Fa!>cist Front
with eq ual rights and obligations .
The Communist Party openly addresses
th e Chri stian Democrat s inviting them to
consider these propositions .
There is of course much that divided
and still divides the Marxists and the
Christi.in Democrats, but we also have
commo n interests. and the his1ory of our
co untr y has conclusively shown us that
whenever we have su cceeded in acting
together and achieving unit y on what is
most important , the country and the
people have derived concrete benefit
th erefrom.
Unity is the imperative of th P mom ent.
The achi eve ment of unit y will be the first
vi crory over all 1he insti ga tors of enmity
and divi sion past and prese nt.
The Chilean Communi sts have stressed
that they visualize the Anti-Fascist Front as
a· r'novement capable of giving the country a government including all th e forces
belonging to th e Front. " The end objective of th e Anti-Fascist Front the creation
of which the popular for ces stand for is
the overthrow of the dictatorship, the
abolition of the to1alitarian . police state it
has established, and th e building of a
new lawful. democratic , anti-fascist , national, popular. pluralistic state able to
ensure democratic renewal and the
n>mplete eradication of fa scis m, to carry
out revolutionary changes and achieve
national independence. '' The character
of thi, sta te will be finallv determined on
th e basis of the com~on views of all
participants in the Front and, naturally
taking into account th e fin est trad itions
and democratic achievements of our
people.
We shall only repeat 1hat among the
men in military unifor m we distinguish
between the fascists and the non-fascists,
between the torturers and 1hose who
refuse to be party to criminal practices,
between the honest and the di shonest ,
between the promot ers of the co nspiracy
and thP dee eived. Th e sig ns are that a
little more than y<'ar afrer the betrayal
c>ngincert>d by a group of se nior offin•rs
thne is a growing rPlunance in the ranb
of the army to co ntinue acting as the
guardian s of the rich ,ind j ailers of the
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p o or , J~ th e exc·cutIoncr, ot the ir own
rwo plP .
Th ,- i wn p lt· rnu q tw ,H In mind that
d(lml·\ tic rPJction and imperiali~m Jre
devi~ing reserve strategems with a view
to th e ro , sible replacement of the junta
bv anot her government while preserving
their privileges. In working towards this
end . r(•action above all seeks to isolate
the Communist Party in order to weaken
and d ewo y the popular movement.
Th e struggle for anti-fascist unity is
therefore also a struggle against all
reacti ,rnary or concilliatory ways out of
the present situation, against all attempts
to prevent the working class and other
more conscious sections of the people
from playing the responsible role that
belongs to them in the future of Chile.
Only through the broadest unity can the
way be barred to any such alternative
involving in the final analysis the division
of the people in the interests of their
enemies.
For this reason the only truly patriotic,
popular alternative presupposes the
creation of a far broader coalition than
Popular Unity, a coalition that would
include all political, social. religious and
military organizations and individuals
determined to put an end to the dictatorship . This is the key task which every
patriot should help to carry out.
Mass Work Remains Decisive
The decisive, vitally necessary precondition for the building of anti-fascist
unity is work among the masses . No
tactics can take the place of this work,
which is the guarantee of victory . There is
no way whatsoever out of the present
situation except through action by the
masses . Victory depends on their participation.
The Anti-Fascist Front will be built
mostly from below, at the level of the
popular organizations, where the people
live. work , study or spend ' their leisure
time. It is here that the revolutionaries
must work to unite the majority and help
it achieve its aspirations , the realization
of which depends in the final analysis on
the type of government at the head of
the country.
It is the prime duty of all anti-fascists to
belong to mass organizations . Fascism
seek s to prevent all manifestations of
independence on the part of the Chilean
people 's public organizations. In its
effort s to turn the country into a military
barracks it is trying to nush all democratic act ivitv.
Clc>arly , the majority of the people do
not accc'pt the state of affairs created by
the rolicy of the junta and fc>el that it
cannot last. Bur it is also obvious that
m:im· are unclear about thc> vvay out.
Onlv if the advancc>d patriob take part in
the v,:ork of the mass organi1atiom_will it
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t>(' pc,\, ibl c• tu g ui d t·. or g,rniH• ,rn cJ un itP
thP ma «, p~ , o a, to huild up ,uffi cipnt
:-, ill'll ~t h t(1 chsfp~Jt !hf' d1 ct;! l(Jl ~h ip. 10 worl<. tor virt CH} wit ho ul rt·cour~l' to
reek.le~, actions. Neediess to sav , in the
conditions of the dict atorship it - is mor e
diificult to conduct active work among
the masse s than it was before . Nevetheles s. although th e forms of struggle must
now be diff erent , the usurpers are powe rle ss to pr eve nt legal activity by th e
revoluti o nari es and all democrat s in the
popular organizations . in the struggle to
resolve the problems confronting the
people.
The most important thing today is the
restoration of trade union rights, primarily the right to put forward demands and
to strike. Many trade unions have won
wage increases over and above the limits
allowed by the junta. A number of
federations are insisting on their right to
participate in the drafting of the proposed reforms of the Labour Code, social
security system, and the social status of
enterprises , resisting the fascist junta's
attempts to decide these questions without the participation of the parties concerned.
Another essential aspect of work
among the masses is the illegal, underground activity of the anti-fascist organizations and the people in general. Legaf
and illegal work constitute a single whole
and must complement each other . Only
through clandestine organization can the
character of the junta , its crimes and antinational actions be publicly exposed, its
obscurantist ideology combated , and the
possibility preserved, despite the difficult
conditions, of guiding , organizing and
uniting the numerous popular actions.
Clandestine work will be the more
effective and significant the closer it is
linked with the struggle waged by the
broad masses, and especially if it is
conducted with and by the masses.
The popular movement must reject the
path of terror , of action by small groups ,
of adventurism . To tc:Ke this path would
mean playing into the hands of fascism .
The year of domination by the oppressors has shown that the dictators would
like to impel the popular movement
1; w • .irds actions of this order . since this
would give them a pretext to seize upon
to justify their crirr'!'- .
It is essential to preve ,,t the emer~ence
and spread of tpnclPncies passively to
wait for a nonexistent solutiur, to be
served up from 5-omewhere ,w,·· ,nd the
bound~ of the mass movement. The junta
i~ snrt•,Hlin~ rumours about the establishment ot a guvernment in exile and the
formation of armed gt'3ups outside the
country with the object of taking over
power. The main purpose of this invention is to discredit the powerful international solidarity movement a~ " interven-

tioni~rn " , and also to doom th e po pular
mJ~~e~ to inactivity , to induce 1hem
p.h ,iH•h to ,ubmit to thP exploitati o n
and abuses and wait for the " grpat day "
or "gr eat action" that would allegedly
change the slate of affairs.
Needless to say, the great day of
people 's triumph will come, but it will
come only if the millions of Chileans
wage a mass struggle within the country ,
if an organized character is imparted to
1h e protest actions everywhere an1 : a!i
patriot s are united in the Anti-Fascist
Front.

Luis Corvolan, jailed general MCNtary of

tl!t Chi~n Communist Party.

.
Many of the former patriotic supporters of the Allende government are now
in the fascist jails of General Pinochet.
With U.S. support, the fascist junta is
preparing to massacre Communist, Socialist , Christian Democrats and all other
people who were in the Allende government. Luis Corvalan , General Secretary of
the Chilean Communist Party, and others
such as Carlos Matus, Jose Cademartori,
Daniel Vergara, Fernando Flores, Anibal
Palm and 180 other political prisoners
face the real possibility of losing their
lives. The time is now for all progressive
forces to demand their freedom. The
time is now to protest and work for their
lives and their freedom. Immediate
protests (telegrams especially) must be
directed to President Ford or Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger. Protests should
also be sent to the : Chilean Embassy,
1730 Massachusetts Ave. N.W ., Wash.,
D .C. 20036 - (202) 785-1746 or to Kurt
Waldheim, Secretary General of the
United Nations, New York, New York

10017 -

(212) 754-1234.
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1·/ioven1e;;n l n Chile
Popular Front - 1939
As a result of the intensification of th e
soc ial struggle brought abo ut by th e
l'co no mic crisis. the Radical Porty began
to adopt a more moderate le ftist position . This was due , on the one hand , to
th e reforming zeal of the Party 's lower
middle classes who had been hardest hit
by the economic crisis. On the other
hand, it was an attempt by the Radical
lead e rship to circumvent the ris ing militancy of the proletariat . This move toward the left allowed for the development
of Chile's first Popular Front government
in 7939. The Front, was a coalition
between the Communist, Socialist and
Radical parties. For the first time in Chile,
leaders from the parties of the center-left
and left worked together to defeat the
candidate of the oligarchy. The Front's
presidential candidate, Pedro Aguirre
Cerda, a radical, won a close election and
then struggled until his death in 1941 to
realize the Front's promises to the nation.
This was an almost impossible task , since
he presided over an uneasy alliance and
was blocked at each step by a congress
controlled by conservatives. The Front
proposed numerous reforms . The one
implemented most successfully wa s the
formation of the National Development
Corporation (CORFO) which was designed to stimulate and finance industrial
development. In the end, CORFO was
used by the state to promote partial
industrialization beneficial to the capitalist class.
The 1939 government was only the first
in a series of popular front governments
which were to appear in Chile from that
time to the 1950s. In 1942, after the
unexpected death of Aguirre, the Front
joined hands to elect a well-known, anticommunist leader in the Radical Party,
Juan Antonio Rios . These popular front
coalitions continued to remain under the
hegemony of the Radical Party.
Splits ln The Left

The Radical Party was able to assert its
leadership, largely, because of the continual factional warfare within the Left
movement. The Socialist Party and Communist Party had carried on a constant
fight for control of the trade-unions and
vied with each other for posts in the
Popular Front governments. They also
held ideological differences, particularly,
on international questions. The Socialists,
for instance, tried to oust the Communists from the government because the
Communists supported the Soviet
Union-German Non-Aggression Pact of
1939. Unsue<;:essful in this effort the
Socialists temporarily withdrew from the
coalition in 1941.
The immediate post-war years witnessed a deeper split in the leadership of
the Chilean Left. The demands of the
wartime economy had served to delay
the crisis which had jolted the Chilean
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which reac hed a climax with the killing of
,ix 1'1.nrk,·rs du ri ng a dernu n,trJtion in
~u ppor t 0 1 a n:t rate wo rker\ strike . .A.
general st rike was called. In an attempt to
forestall the strike. the Socialist Party
leadership was offered posts in the
government. After some negotiations,
the Socialists accepted the offer and tried
to call off the strike. As a consequence.
the Socialists lost th e support of some
trade-unions to the Communist Party and
were brand ed sell-outs by the Communist Party leadership .
The 1946 presidential election found
the Communist Party again in coalition
with the Radical Party. The Socialists were
left out of this front. The Front's candidate, Conzales Videla, won the election.
The new government was set up with the
Communists holding three seats in the
nine man cabinet.
Not long after Videla became president, he turned against the Communists,
purged them from the labor movement,
and prohibited their participation in
national life . This attitude was largely a
reflection of the anti-communist campaign led by the United States govern•
ment.
The Masses Remain Poor

One of the Front's most striking failures was that during the entire period
from 1938 to 1952 nothing was done
about land reform . Even large estates
went untaxed. In 1955, an agricultural
census indicated that the old property
relations had remained basically unchanged, fewer than 10 percent of the
landowners owned 86 percent of the
arable land, while 74.6 percent of the
poor peasants owned only 5.3 percent of
the land. Furthermore wages of the
working classes fell from 27 percent to 21
percent of the national income during
the years 1940-53.
It was in the election of 1952 that
Salvador Allende began his climb to the
presidency. Although one of the founders of the Socialist Party, he had gained
the respect of me mbers of both Leftwing parties. The Leftist parties were too
badly split and the masses too demoralized to rally more than 6 percent of the
vote for Allende. A right-wing demagogue, Carlos Ibanez, who had been the
Nazi-backed candidate of 1938, swept the
election. Ibanez had run a very demagogic campaign, but once in office, his
completely reactionary, anti-working
class politics became obvious.
During lbanez 's term, the living conditions of the work ing masses continued to
worsen . The rate of inflation climbed
incredibly. The cost of living rose 56
percent, 70 percent, 80 percent, 40
percent, and 20 percent, respectively, in
the years 1953-57. The working-class,
faced with a rapidly deteriorating econ-
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In 1953. the l;1bor movement undPrwent a period of reo rganizat ion , and the
United Federat ion of Workers (CUT) was
formed . Thi , ,ig nalPd the gro wing unity
within lef tist wo rk er's ranks.
A New Popular Front
Three years later, the Popular Action
Front (FRAP) was formed . This time the
coalition of Socialist and Communist
parties did not include the middle-class
dominated Radical Party. FRAP began to
intensify its efforts to give the workingclass movement new unified leader ~hip.
Criticism was registered aginst the Ibanez
government for allowing the army to
forcefully break-up a mass demonstration of students and workers. The demonstration in which forty to sixty workers
were killed, was in protest against the
raising of bus fares.
By 1958, FRAP had become deeply
rooted in the urban and rural proletariat
and it was prepared to launch its greatest
organized effort. The coalition would run
Allende for the presidency.
FRAP's program included agrarian
reform by expropriation; nationalization
of banks, insurance companies and the
petroleum and sugar industries; the
creation of state-run enterprises and
mixed public-private companies in heavy
industry; higher taxation of high incomes ; a change of direction in foreign
trade, particularly with the socialist countries and other Latin American countries.
In the election Allende lost to the
conservative Jorge Alessandri by 35,000
votes.
While FRAP continued to build its
working class base, the Radical Party
cooperated with president Alessandri in
his program of expansion and stabilization, which resulted in an annual rate of
inflation of around 40 percent, a rise in
food prices, the stagnation of industrial
production and a rash of wage claims.
A New Middle-Class Party

As the 1964 election approached, the
Radical Party, threatened by the militancy of the proletariat, joined with the
Conservative and Liberal parties to form
what was called a " Democratic Front".
The Liberal and Conservative parties had
always represented the interest of the
large-landed proprietors and the industrial and commercial elites. However, the
coalition collapsed before the campaign
ended and the Conservatives and Liberals supported the Christian Democrat,
Eduardo Frei.
The Christian Democratic Party (PDC)
was the last born of Chile s major
political parties. Its ideology was a mixture of paternalism, Christian socialism,
corporatism and charity. PDC's support
came, largely, from the urban middleclasses most of which had formerly
supported the Radical Party.
(continued on page 7)
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f r('i \ c Jmp<1 i~n wa, dP~i~n l' d to
r rC'dit ~RAP among the t'IPCl<Hate . With
ur to o n (•-milli o n dol lar, pPr n10 n1h from
L.'. S. ,ource,, fr ei promised a "Re\C>lution in Libert y" . and headPd a ma ss ive
rropa g anda o ffensive whose basic
me ~~ag e wa, that FRAP meant communism, and communism meant the end of
all freedom. Mainly because of these
scare tactics, Allende lost the election by
a wide margin , receiving only 38.9 percent of the vote to Frei's 56.1 p e rcent .
As could be predicted. the PDC's
popularity grew with the expectations
c reated by its promises, and declined
with the realization that it could not
d eliver . As the PDC declined from 1964
to 1970, the worker's and peasant's
movements grew both in size and militancy. Instead of placating the m _
asses,
the limited PDC reforms only convinced
them of the validity of their struggle and
of the vulnerability of the ruling class.
The continued decline in the standard
of living of the workers gave rise to a
more militant unified left movement.
This radicalization was especially marked
among the peasantry. There were increasing numbers of land occupations by the
peasants . Peasant unions grew from a few
thousand members in 1964 to over
100.000 by 1969.
Confrontation s between striking worker s and police were on the rise throughout the period . In March 1966, police
killed seven miners and injured twentylive at the well known El Teniente mine.
Police occupied Anaconda's El Salvador
and Potrilla mines when the miners came
out in support of the El Teniente workers.
In November 1967, a twenty-four-hour
general strike resulted in the mobilization of all Chile's troops , including the
navy and air force .
In Puerto Montt on March 10, 1969, an
infamous massacre took place . A thousand homeless poor attempted to use the
public land in order to build shacks _to
live in . The repress_ive forces were sent in ,
killing five and wounding thirty-seve n.
By May and June, the army was running
the train s in an attempt to break a
railroad worker 's strike .
In 1970, students joined clerical workers striking for higher wages to meet the
runaway inflation plaguing Chile 's economy. Following weeks of confrontations,
two students were killed and a state of
emergency was declared.
It was under conditions of violent class
struggle that the 1970 election which
bro ught Allende to power to ok plac~.
Tht> coalition of Marxist and bourgeois
partit>s which triumphed was named the
Popular Unity.
Allende's victory, in short, wa s the byproduct of popular frontism in Chile and
of the n ew radi calization S\\Pep,ng th e
Chikan ma.,ses.

( i • ,· · . : · '1f Jt ·1 • ,< I ) tl 1 t · • ,: · t · ci·-<; i.if1;·.- ~ i'I l [) ( ~m C' ri< <1 11 l m ti t ut p ior Fr t•e
L.ilm r Dt·v c·lopnwnt) to o rgani zt· anti -L,P
tr ade as~ o ciat,on s and " union," to t all
p o litical ~trike ~ to rara ly~e th e C' co nomy ;
en co uragPmPnt of .-mo u~e o f age nts
pr ovoc ateurs in " ultra-left" _
g roups to
also provoke strikes and to frighten th.e
middle cla ss by unauthorized nat1onal1zat ion of small busin e sses. The final
pr eparation was the mass assassinations
of lo yalist military office rs, leading to the
final, fas cist military coup.
1

U. S. Intervention
'd ef <' a 1. Agdin in 1%9, ac cor din g to the

~(·rr C't C o lhv 1P'1 irnon y , $500 .000 w ,i ~
;iuthnr i1(·d b v trw fortv Co rrnn:1t ee I J
~p eu al grour; ing in the \'\h1t e Hou,e,
including Fo rd, Ro ckef ell o w , Ki ssinge r
and others) to "fund individu ab who
could be ~urtured to k eep th e antiAllende for ces active and intact."
L.S. milit ary inv o lvement in Chile ,
before and during the Allende government . took the form of millions of dollars
in military "aid" and the training of
military offi cers of all branches. In th e
past 20 years , over 4,000 Chilean military
officers have been trained in U.S.
schools, either in the U.S. or the Panama
Canal Zone . These include the four
original members of the fascist junta. The
Chilean police force, the Carabineros,
received $2.5 million from the Agency for
International Development.
After 1970 - A Frenzied
Increase of U.S. Intervention
The Popular Unity plurality in 1970 sent
the U.S . agents in Chile into a frenzy. The
subversive plan hatched by ITT and the
CIA in 1970, which was exposed by Jack
Anderson in March 1972, was carried out
to the letter. As the Allende government
moved to return copper and other
monopolized wealth of Chile to the
people of Chile, the ITT - CIA plan of
" destabilization" went into effect. The
plan included creating economi_c chaos
while at the same time funding the
regular military and terrorist right wing
groups to prepare a military c<?up. Wh~n
the UP government increased its plurality
in the March 1973 elections, the U .S. plan
for a violent overthrow was stepped up.
The 2 billion dollar Chilean debt, owed
mostly to U.S. sources, was accumulated
by pre-UP governments , especially the
Christian Democrats. The World Bank
refused Allende 's plea to renegoitate the
debt, and the U .S. cut commercial credits
drastically (down to $3 million) , but
greatly increased military "aid" to $45.5
millions.
To quote the Sun Times, 9-8-74, "Th _
e
Forty Comrnittee authorized a~ - a~d1tional $5 million for more destab1ltzat1on
efforts during the period from 1971 to
1973." The CIA plan called first for
bribing the Chilean congressmen not to
name Allende as President. When that
didn't work, the ITT-CIA plan called for a
military uprising by right-wing officers to
prevent Allende's inauguration. In October 1970, Gen . Schneider, the Commander-in-Chief who respected the
constitution, was assassinated. However,
a general strike by labor stopped the
fascists and Allende was inaugurated. The
plan then called for heavy financial
support of the virulent anti-UP press (e/
fvfr>rcurio), for an undeclared blockade
and economic war by the U.S. to strangle
the d ep e nde nt Chilean econo my ; organ-
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U.S . Role in
The Military Coup
Mrs. Hortensia Allende, widow of the
President , revealed the direC1 military
role of the U.S. in the Sept. 11 , 197Jcoup.
Speaking to the Conference on "CIA
AND WORLD PEACE" held April 5, 1975_
at Yale University, Mrs. Allende cited the
presence of U.S. warsh ips in Chilean
waters immediately before and after the
coup . She described the arrival of 32 U .S.
observation and battle planes on the
Chilean border at Mendoza, Argentina,
and the arrival of 150 U.S. "specialists in
air acrobatics" in Chile - all this just days
before the coup. U.S. air force Majors V.
Duenas and T. Schull, according to Mrs.
Allende, piloted their plane no. WB-575,
plate no . 631-2398, in the battle zones
during the Chilean coup. Their plane was_
a fl ying electronic control station and was
used to coordinate the junta 's military
communications .
The Chilean experience is one of the
most shameful chapters in U.S. for_eign
policy. We can learn from the events in
Chile that the U.S. imperialists will not
even allow a people to choose socialism
as an answer to their problems if it is not
in the interest of the U.S. capitalists. But
this temporary set back will not live long,
because the people of Chile are showing
new strer.gth in their struggle against
fascism. History has proven to be on the
side of people wanting to be free.
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;. ic 1i1 ~ir·, •( '' .1 1! :~1•,·q r· !ti .inc t, ,;'-1 ' --. in tl H·
\, \ . : ;: l l ~ . - : ; ; 1° i 1 • • : , • ... ... i , t
i •. ; ; ), 1•. •i... <. , , r l ii r rn u: h , · ., ,.,. ,111 ,! ~.1t tlw tutur(' l>c-longs
tu f1 vnlo111. /H'.t< P .1nd eq11,1 li1y as pc>ople
,H e ~trl: i~ gl:11g ,lllll; nd th e \Vorirl to rirl
th(:rmcl~c~~ of the imperi alist yoke.
Each year the forces of world revolution : the socialist countries , the national
liberation movements in the developing
rountries. and the anti-monopoly forc es
in the capitalist countries grow stronger.
This year, May Day took on a spe.cia 1
meaning with the victories in lndoChina . This year, the celebration belongs
to the patriotic liberation forces in South
East Asia, particularly the Vietnamese
people who have suffered from and
resisted so long the Chinese , Japanese,
French and United States aggression .
1

:.

l h(· '«,tr, ()1 t ii1>s(·
rt •m,111)

nn the

l.111d

\ ('.lJ,

,,.1 :

Pl

·, ,il l

.rnd on thl' f'l'opk t11

\ i!'tn., m fo r

\1 •,ir, to COl11( '. l h (•rt· .i rt ·
?t'n, o1 1h " u ... ,11 11L. (lt .H r{ \\h t r P < tn~1,
1

,

1

·.-.d; 1o , , 1 ~1111, 1"1 rn.rn, \( •,11, . l 11nu;1H•r.1hl t• IH )ll~h crJh•r, i rom l.1~p~ that dot the
\ 'ic>tnamP,f' rountrysidP . Children will
grow ur mi\s ing .irm\ and leg\ and
carrying th<' Hars of napalm . \\'e c.innot
forget the couragc>ous strength of the~e
pPo rle . nor the de~tructive rol e of our
government.
The victorie s in Southea~t Asia are of
true hi~torical ~ignificance, because th f'Y
dealt a tremend o us blow against r arism
and
imperialist
brutality . All antiimperialist force s join in solidarity with
the people of Inda-China . and also
applaud the unswerving support from
the socialist countries . especially the
support given by the Soviet U nion which
was critical for these victories.
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Chile's Experience
social transformations and growing resistance of the bourgeoisie; the strategic
- the strengthening of the alliance of
democratic forces, and first of all the
alliance with the middle urban segments,
the forming of a social army of the
revolution.
It should be noted , however, that there
was no theoretical elaboration and political substantiation of the ways, forms and
methods of solving these key problems
and this had a negative effect on the
entire development of the struggle. !..eftwing extremists contended that a direct
stage of the socialist revolution had
started, that an offensive against the
bourgeoisie as a whole had started and
for this reason arbitrarily carried out
adventuristic expropriations.
The Communist Party of Chile held a
correct position, saying that there still
remained unsolved some tasks of the
anti-imperialist, antioligarchic revolution . But there was no clear-cut substantiation of the roads and methods of the
speediest attainment of these tasks .

Meanwhile it was only this road and
by pursuing a very flexible policy that
would rule out Leftist adventurism that it
could be possible to strengthen the
alliance of the working class with the
middle layers and ensure the revolution's
advance . But no such clarity was introduced into politics . The revolution was
marking time . Reaction stepped u_p its
activities and somewhere at the close of
1972 began to switch to the offensive. In
many instances the revolutionary forces
did not hold a vigorously offensive stand
in respect to the reactionary circles . This
was one of the crucial miscalculations
made by the Popular Unity coalition .
A fierce class struggle started in the
country in all fields - political. economic
and ideological. The struggle for power
was exceptionally tense. Allende 's victory
signified the creation of a revolutionarydemocratic government but it did not
enjoy full power. And the cardinal
question of the revolution - the establishment of popular, democratic power
- was not solved .
There were two centers of power in
the country ; the popular one that concentrated in its· hands mostly the executive power in the person of President
Allende and his government, and a
reactionary center that held in its hands
legislative power , the judiciary, most of
the state apparatus and the mass media.
Reaction used bourgeois constitutionalism and legality, all levers of parliamenH;irold Rog<• r~
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tary power and the judiciary to limit to
the minimum the transforming activities
of the executive power under the guise
of observing legality and then to paralyze
it. At the same time, reaction violated all
norms of legality.
React ion carried the class struggle
bevond the framework of constitutionalis~ and legality. At the same time the
Allend e government could not transgress
the framework of constitutionalism in its
actions to suppress the unlawful actions
of the class enemy . Loyalt y to bourg·eois
constitutionalism was determin ed by the
coalition's program documents. There
was still another factor - the army . It was
an important political force. As to its legal
neutralization , it was ensured by the
concept of constitutionalism of administration.
Being fettered by these circumstances ,
the Allende government actually left
inatct the bourgeois state apparatus and
the judiciary which sabotaged the popular government's undertakings . Using
this, the reaction mustered its forces and
prepared for an offensive.
The Allende governments' measures
against reaction , including its fascist
wing . were of little effect . The entire
complexity of the political situation was
that because of wrong political steps the
correct course - to avoid civil war brought closer civil war in its most
dangerous form for the revolution , in the
form of a military-fasci st coup.
Edilori.il Bo.ird
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